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Abstract
We consider a capital accumulating incumbent firm which produces an
established product and has the option to introduce an improved substitute
product to the market by incurring adoption costs. We find that depending
on the initial capacities on the established market and the value of adop-
tion costs, three scenarios are possible, namely introducing immediately,
later or abstaining from product introduction. In case of delay of product
introduction, the incumbent reduces capacities for the established product
before the new product is introduced. We encounter Skiba points where
the incumbent is indifferent between two of the three scenarios and use a
bifurcation analysis in order to characterize the transition towards different
steady states.
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1 Introduction
For many firms, especially those operating in the high-tech sector, whenever a new
technology is available, they have to decide whether to adjust the product range
by incorporating the new technology and if yes, when to do so.
Wang and Hui (2012) provide examples of firms hesitating to incorporate new
available technologies and choosing to stay with the old technology for a while.
Examples include the technology of DVD that has been developed much earlier
than vendors started promoting DVDs. Another example is the MP3 standard.
In an empirical investigation, Chandy and Tellis (2000) have found that a large
fraction of product innovations has been achieved by incumbents. Indeed, we face
such a situation described above often in real-world markets and in many indus-
tries, submarkets evolve and coexist with the established product. An example is
the TV Industry where CRT televisions and flatscreens were sold simultaneously
for a long time (cf. Dawid et al. (2015)).
We consider an incumbent firm which has the option to introduce a horizontally
and vertically differentiated substitute product which has a higher quality than
the established one. For realizing this option, it incurs one-time adoption costs.
Thus, the firm has to determine if the product introduction is profitable and if yes,
when the optimal time of product introduction is. After introduction, we assume
that the firm sells both products.
The firm faces the following trade-off: At the one hand, by launching the new
product it cannibalizes demand for the established product and at the other hand,
it benefits from the new product with higher quality by exploiting higher willing-
ness to pay of the consumers. We find that the cannibalization effect alone cannot
cause a delay. Delay is optimal if and only if there are adoption costs as well e.g.
coming from adjustment costs of the plant, advertisement activities or fees paid
to developers for using their technologies.
In particular, we find that if the firm is strong at the established market, i.e. its
capacities are at a high level, then the firm decides to wait and hence to introduce
the improved product later. By delaying, the firm benefits from discounting adop-
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tion costs while it decreases the capacity of the established product before the new
product is introduced. This reduction of capacity increases the marginal values of
the capacities of the established and the new product at the time of product intro-
duction. Amongst others, this enables the incumbent to build-up capacities for the
new product faster when it is introduced, compared to immediate introduction.
There is a large literature on capital accumulating firms which has been extended
by Dawid et al. (2015) who analyzed the optimal R&D effort for product innovation
and capital accumulation of established and new products, where the breakthrough
probability of developing a new product depends on both, a knowledge stock and
current R&D efforts via a hazard rate. Hence, in that paper innovation time is
stochastic and it is assumed that the new product is introduced immediately once
it is available. We focus on the optimal timing of product introduction and opti-
mal investment in capacities and differ from Dawid et al. (2015) in not considering
R&D efforts to develop a new product and not linking successful development to
market introduction but considering the time of market introduction as a choice
variable. The classical literature on optimal timing of technology adoption (see.
e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1972) for a single firm and Reinganum (1981) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for a duopoly) assumes that quality increases due
to technological progress and the only decision variable is the time of technology
adoption. Farzin et al. (1998) and Doraszelski (2004) extend this stream of litera-
ture by considering the quality improvement as a stochastic process. In contrast,
in our model, the quality of the new product is fixed and the firm cannot gain addi-
tional quality by delaying. Thus, our analysis focuses on the dependence on initial
characteristics whose importance has been addressed a lot, e.g. in Hinloopen et al.
(2013) where initial marginal costs determine if a technology is developed further
or not. Real options models (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) have focussed
on optimal timing in continuous time where demand is stochastic e.g. evolving
according to a Brownian motion. A simultaneous analysis of optimal timing and
optimal investment in capacities in the real options literature has been provided
by Huisman and Kort (2015) where the price of the good is stochastic. We dif-
fer from that stream of literature by considering a deterministic environment and
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continuous adjustments of capacities.
The problem of an incumbent delaying product introduction has been addressed
in Wang and Hui (2012). They apply a discrete three-period time framework where
they do not take into account capacity adjustments. In contrast to Wang and Hui
(2012), in our model, delaying cannot be optimal if there are no adoption costs.
From a technical perspective, we employ Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for
free end time (see. e.g. Grass et al. (2008)) to obtain analytical results concerning
the optimal investments and the optimal time of market introduction.
Moreover, in this optimal control problem, due to the non-concave structure
of the value function, the Arrow-Mangasarian sufficiency conditions are not met
which for certain states lead to the presence of multiple optimal investment paths.
In particular, we characterize situations in which the firm is indifferent between
approaching different steady states (see Skiba (1978)). In such models, qualitative
properties of solutions depend very much on parameters (cf. Hinloopen et al.
(2013)). Therefore, we use a bifurcation analysis to assess industry dynamics
for different values of adoption costs where we encounter a deformed pitchfork
bifurcation.
The analysis in this paper is carried out for a monopoly setting. Even though
the real-world examples we have raised stem from competitive environments, we
believe that it is important to consider the monopoly as it is interesting in its own
right. Indeed, timing of product introduction is not only influenced by competing
firms but from competing substitute products as well even if there is only a sin-
gle firm. As the established and new product are substitutes, there is ‘internal’
competition between those two products. In order to disentangle rivalry between
products and between firms, it is reasonable to analyze the monopoly case before
proceeding to the competition case.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sect. 2. Sect. 3
is devoted to the technical analysis. In Sect. 4, we provide an economic interpre-
tation, conduct a bifurcation analysis and present optimal timing curves. Sect. 5
analyzes welfare effects of delaying product introduction. Model assumptions are
discussed in Sect. 6 and Sect. 7 concludes.
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2 Model
We consider an incumbent firm which has initial capacity Kini1 to produce an estab-
lished product. A new substitute product with higher quality has been developed
and is ready for market introduction. Product introduction comes with lump-sum
adoption costs F . An important assumption is that the incumbent cannot invest
in capacities of the new product before introducing it, i.e. there are no capacities
at the time of introduction for the new product.
We follow the literature on optimal capital accumulation by relying on a standard
linear model (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)). Thus, the firm faces a linear inverse
demand function which is given by
p1(t) = 1−K1(t). (1)
After product introduction, the inverse linear demand system1 is given by
p1(t) = 1−K1(t)− ηK2(t), (2)
and
p2(t) = 1 + θ − ηK1(t)−K2(t), (3)
where η with 0 < η < 1 measures the degree of horizontal and θ > 0 the degree of
vertical differentiation of the substitutes.
The firm wants to determine the optimal time of product introduction T and
the optimal investment strategies before and after product introduction. There is
no inventory, i.e. capacities equal sales2. The capacity dynamics are
K˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δKi(t), i = 1, 2, (4)
K1(0) = K
ini
1 , K2(t) = K
ini
2 = 0 ∀ t ≤ T, (5)
1This demand system is motivated by the fact that the two products are substitutes and
competing with each other. According to the seminal result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
setting prices optimally subject to ex-ante capacity commitments reduces to a Cournot setting
which we adopt here.
2This assumption has been used in large parts of the literature on dynamic capacity invest-
ment, see e.g. Goyal and Netessine (2007). See Section 6 for a discussion of this assumption.
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where δ > 0 measures the depreciation rate. As has been done in Dawid et al.
(2015), we allow the firm to intentionally scrap capacities, i.e. Ii ∈ R while capac-
ities have to remain non-negative:
Ki(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (6)
Adjusting capacities is costly, in particular it comes with quadratic costs
C
(
Ii(t)
)
=
γ
2
I2i (t), i = 1, 2. (7)
Normalizing production costs to zero, the objective function of the firm is given
by the following expression:
max
T,I1(t),I2(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t)− C(I1)
)
dt
+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t) + p2(t)K2(t)− C(I1)− C(I2)
)
dt− e−rTF.
(8)
We refer to this problem as P(Kini1 ).
3 Analysis
In case that the firm wants to introduce the improved product at some finite time
T , there will be a structural change of the model. Therefore, we denote by mode 1
(m1) the optimal control problem up to time T and by mode 2 (m2) the problem
after T . Denote by V m1(K1) and V
m2(K1, K2) the corresponding value functions
of the infinite horizon control problems where the mode is fixed and hence does not
change3. The optimal control problem at hand where the mode m might change
is denoted by V (K1, K2, t,m) and we refer to this problem as the optimal control
problem with introduction option.
The subproblem in m2 is linear-quadratic with infinite time horizon which can be
solved easily, as has been done in Dawid et al. (2015). The optimal strategy and the
value function are stationary for this problem, i.e. V (K1, K2, t,m2)=V
m2(K1, K2).
There is a unique globally asymptotically stable steady under the optimal strategy
3We suppress the argument t wherever it is possible and does not cause confusion.
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and the value function is given by4
V m2(K1, K2) = a+ bK1 + cK
2
1 + dK2 + eK
2
2 + fK1K2. (9)
The typical shape of the value function of m2 is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Value function of m2 at T , i.e. for K2 = 0. Parameters: r = 0.04, δ =
0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
By regarding the value function of the subproblem as the salvage value of the
optimal control problem with introduction option, we can rewrite (8) by
max
T,I1(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t)− C(I1(t))
)
dt+ e−rTS
(
K1(T )
)
, (10)
where S
(
K1(T )
)
= V m2(K1(T ), 0)− F .5 This problem can be solved analytically
by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for variable terminal time. The Hamiltonian
is
H(K1, I1, λ, t) = (1−K1)K1 − γ
2
I21 + λ(I1 − δK1), (11)
where λ is the co-state variable and the optimal investment is given by
I1 =
λ
γ
. (12)
The co-state equation reads
λ˙ = (r + δ)λ− (1− 2K1), (13)
and the transversality condition is given by6
λ(T ) = SK1 = V
m2
K1
(K1, 0). (14)
4Equations for coefficients are given in Dawid et al. (2015).
5K2(T ) = 0 since there are no capacities for the new product at T , yet.
6The canonical system, isoclines, the steady state for staying in m1 and its stability properties
are given in Appendix A.1.
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For nonzero finite T ∗, let
(
K∗1(·), I∗1 (·)
)
be an optimal solution to (10) on the
optimal time interval [0, T ∗]. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for variable end
time implies an additional constraint for the terminal time, which is given by
H(K∗1(T
∗), I∗1 (T
∗), λ(T ∗), T ∗) = rS
(
K∗1(T
∗)
)− ST (K∗1(T ∗)). (15)
Note that the salvage value does not depend explicitly on T ∗ and hence,
ST
(
K∗1(T
∗)
)
= 0. (16)
So, equation (15) requires that at the optimal time T ∗, the instantaneous revenue
from staying in m1 plus the assessment of the change of the state variable on the
one hand (which is given by the current-value Hamiltonian, abbr. by H) and the
interest on the salvage value (abbr. by rS) on the other hand are equal. This is
quite intuitive since otherwise it would be optimal to stay longer in m1 if H is
higher than rS or to have introduced earlier if rS is higher than H.
In Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2, we state that there are two solutions for equation
(15). By that lemma and Proposition 1 below, we show that for F = 0, both
solutions coincide and H ≤ rS for all values of established capacity, i.e. immediate
introduction is optimal and hence T ∗ = 0. For F > 0, there are two distinct
points satisfying the terminal condition. In the corresponding interval, where the
boundaries are given by the two points satisfying (15), there is H ≥ rS (cf. Figure
12 in Appendix A.2), i.e. for initial capacities in the interval, it is optimal to reduce
capacities down to the lower bound and to introduce the new product, we say to
jump to m2. We denote the two solutions of (15) by K
lb
1 and K
ub
1 , respectively
for lower and upper bound of the interval with K lb1 ≤ Kub1 . As mentioned above,
for F = 0, both solutions coincide7, i.e. K lb1 = K
ub
1 (see Appendix A.2), which we
denote by KF=01 .
So, for higher capacities than Kub1 , the unique solution is to introduce the new
product immediately again. In particular at Kub1 , the firm is indifferent between
7Technically, in case of no adoption costs, H and rS are tangential at KF=01 :
∂
∂K1
H(KF=01 , I
∗
1 (T
∗), λ(T ∗), T ∗) =
∂
∂K1
rV m2(KF=01 , 0). (17)
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both options. However, higher capacities than Kub1 will not be analyzed further
as there the firm switches immediately to m2 which has been analyzed in Dawid
et al. (2015).
As the optimal introduction time depends on the size of capacity, we consider
it as a correspondence depending on Kini1 and denote it by T
∗(Kini1 )
8. It is a
correspondence since there are situations with multiple optimal values as we will
discuss in the following. We start by characterizing finite solutions.
Proposition 1. If T ∗(K1) is finite for all K1, then for all K1 ≤ K lb1 , it is optimal
to innovate immediately. For all K lb1 < K1 ≤ Kub1 , it is optimal to reduce capacities
and to innovate when the capacity reaches K lb1 , i.e. T
∗(K1) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Proposition 1 states that immediate introduction is optimal if capacity for the
established product is lower than a certain threshold (given by K lb1 ) whereas for
capacities above, it is optimal to wait and to decrease capacities on the established
market before product introduction. Note, that there are infinite solutions where it
is not optimal to innovate immediately even though Kini1 ≤ K lb1 as we will discuss
at the end of this section.
In the next lemma we focus on the dependence of K lb1 on F and find that K
lb
1 is
decreasing in F , i.e. as adoption costs increase, it takes longer to arrive at K lb1 for
a fixed starting point Kini1 > K
lb
1 .
Lemma 1. K lb1 is decreasing in F .
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In Figure 2, we illustrate how the value function evolves as F increases. For
K lb1 < K1 < K
ub
1 , the value function of the problem with introduction option is
higher than the value function of m2. As F increases and discounting adoption
8An alternative would have been to define a function which gives the remaining time in m1
not depending on the initial but current capacity (cf. Long et al. (2017)).
9Moreover, Kub1 is increasing in F . Thus, for increasing F , the interval [K
lb
1 ,K
ub
1 ] expands
around KF=01 .
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(a) F = 0.5 (b) F = 1
(c) F = 1.2 (d) F = 1.27
Figure 2: Value functions for different values of F . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ =
0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
costs become more important, the difference of the value function with introduction
option and the scrap value function gets larger. Furthermore, as the products are
vertically differentiated, the value of the problem of m2 is higher than of m1 for no
adoption costs. Thus, the value of the problem with introduction option is higher
than the value of the infinite problem of m1. Obviously, for large enough F , the
value function of the problem with introduction option will hit the value function
of the infinite horizon problem of m1 and infinite solutions will occur, i.e. product
introduction will not be sufficiently attractive anymore. We show in Appendix
A.5 in Lemma 3 that there exists a unique value of adoption costs F˜ where this
happens for the first time (see Figure 3). Thus, F˜ is the lowest value of adoption
costs for which it exists some initial value of capacity where the firm abstains from
product introduction. This result leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For F < F˜ , T ∗(K1) is finite for all initial capacities and Proposition
10
Figure 3: Value function for F = F˜ = 1.27437. Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η =
0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
1 applies.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3 in Appendix A.5.
To sum up the results so far, for F = 0, the firm wants to launch the new product
immediately. For increasing F , there arises an interval given by [K lb1 , K
ub
1 ] wherein
the higher Kini1 the longer it takes to arrive at K
lb
1 where the firm wants to launch
the new product, i.e. the stronger the firm on the established market, the more
the firm delays. Moreover, due to Lemma 1, the higher the adoption costs, the
lower is the switching capacity, i.e. the firm wants to reduce capacities more in
advance before switching to m2.
Denote by K˜1 the lowest value of initial capacity where an infinite solution exists
for P(K˜1):
K˜1 = min{K1 | T ∗(K1) =∞}. (18)
Note that K˜1 exists for F ≥ F˜ . The following proposition and corollary charac-
terize the situation at F˜ .
Proposition 2. At F = F˜ ,
K˜1 = K
ss,m1
1
10 (19)
and the free end-time problem P(K˜1) has a unique solution with T ∗ =∞.
10Kss,m11 is the unique steady state for staying infinitely in m1 given in Appendix A.1.
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Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Corollary 2. At F˜ , for K1 < K˜1,
T ∗(K1) <∞, (20)
and for K˜1 ≤ K1 < K¯1,
T ∗(K1) =∞. (21)
Proof. Due to the definition of K˜1, for K1 < K˜1 only finite solutions are optimal.
According to the proof of Proposition 2, for K˜1 ≤ K1 < Kub1 , only infinite solutions
are optimal.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 state that at F˜ , Kss,m11 is a threshold separating
finite and infinite solutions. That is, for K1 ≥ Kss,m11 the firm prefers not inno-
vating and stays in m1, whereas for K < K
ss,m1
1 the firm decreases
11 capacities to
K lb1 and hence introduces the new product eventually.
For characterizing the evolution of K˜1, we denote by F¯ the value of adoption
costs for which
V m1(K lb) = V m2(K lb)− F (= S(K lb)) (22)
holds, i.e. where the firm is indifferent between introducing immediately and
delaying infinitely at K lb1 .
Proposition 3. K˜1 is decreasing in F and for all F˜ < F < F¯ , the free end-time
problem P(K˜1) has two different solutions with optimal terminal times 0 < T f <∞
and T∞ = ∞, i.e. K˜1 is a Skiba point where the firm is indifferent between
introducing the product after some delay and not at all.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
A consequence of Proposition 3 is that as F increases, the range of capacities
where the firm stays with only one product enlarges as K˜1 decreases. Moreover,
there is a finite and infinite solution at K˜1
12. As before, the timing for capacities
11In Appendix A.6 in Lemma 4, we show that at F˜ , Klb1 ≤ Kss,m1 holds.
12There is no other value of capacity where both solutions are optimal.
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lower than K˜1 is finite. So there exist three different ranges of capacities where
optimal time of product introduction is either 0, infinite or in-between. We refer
to [F˜ , F¯ ) as the intermediate range of F and for F ∈ [F˜ , F¯ ) we refer to (K lb1 , K˜1)
as the waiting region.
Denote by F¯ the value of adoption costs where thereafter finite solutions disap-
pear for the first time13, i.e.
T ∗(0) =∞ . (23)
Now, we show that at F¯ the waiting region vanishes and only immediate or infinite
solutions for T remain.
Corollary 3. For F¯ ≤ F < F¯ , there exists a K˜1 > 0 such that for all K1 < K˜1 the
firm introduces the new product immediately whereas for all K1 > K˜1 the firm never
introduces the new product. At K˜1, the incumbent is indifferent, in particular the
free end-time problem P(K˜1) has two different solutions with 0 = T f < T∞ =∞.
Moreover, at F¯ , K˜1 = K
lb
1 .
Proof. By definition of F¯ , the firm is indifferent between immediate and infinite
product introduction. By Proposition 3, K˜1 is decreasing and hits K
lb
1 at F¯ where
solutions with 0 < T <∞ vanish.
Thus, for all F , K˜1 is separating finite and infinite solutions for T . Note that
for F < F¯ , the value function of m2 and the value function of the problem with
introduction option paste smoothly at K lb1 , i.e.
14
∂V (K lb1 , 0,m1)
∂K1
=
∂V m2(K lb1 )
∂K1
. (24)
Furthermore, at F˜ , the value function of the problem with introduction option and
the value function of m1 paste smoothly at K˜1 (see Figure 3) whereas for F > F˜
the value function has a kink at K˜1 (cf. Figure 4).
13As K˜1 is decreasing in F , at F¯ , K1 = 0 is the only remaining value for capacity such that
the firm is indifferent between immediate and no product introduction.
14Note that the value function is time-invariant and hence the time argument can be omitted,
i.e. V (Klb1 ,K
lb
1 , t,m) = V (K
lb
1 ,K
lb
1 ,m).
13
Figure 4: Value function for high F . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η = 0.9, θ =
0.1, γ = 0.15, F = 1.3.
3.1 Summary of Results
In total, as long as F is intermediate (i.e. F˜ ≤ F < F¯ ), we can split the state
space in three parts:
i) ‘Immediate introduction’: K1 ≤ K lb1 : Firm innovates immediately, T ∗ = 0.
ii) ‘Delayed product introduction’: K lb1 < K1 ≤ K˜1: Firm delays introduction
and introduces product later at 0 < T ∗ <∞.
iii) ‘No introduction’: K1 ≥ K˜1: Firm delays introduction infinitely, i.e. there
is no product introduction.
For increasing F the indifference point K˜1 shifts to the left and eventually the
waiting region vanishes where K˜1 and K
lb
1 coincide and only two possibilities re-
main: Either the firm innovates immediately (for low capacities) or never (for high
capacities). Hence, for F ≥ F¯ , the value function is given by the upper curve of
the value functions V m1 and V m2 (see Figure 4).
We call F low if 0 < F < F˜ , intermediate if F˜ ≤ F < F¯ , high if F¯ ≤ F ≤ F¯
and very high if F > F¯ .
• If there are no adoption costs, only scenario i) is prevalent.
• For low adoption costs, scenarios i) and ii) are possible depending on the
initial capacity level.
• If F is intermediate, all three scenarios are possible.
14
• For high adoption costs, only scenarios i) and iii) are possible.
• For very high adoption costs, only scenario iii) is prevalent.
4 Dynamics
In Section 4.1, we give an economic interpretation of the optimal capacity invest-
ments and the timing decision. A bifurcation analysis is presented in Section 4.2.
Optimal timing curves and its dependence on parameters of horizontal and vertical
differentiation are given in Section 4.3.
In order to derive dynamics, we consider the following default parameter setting
taken from Dawid et al. (2015):
r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15. (25)
4.1 Economic Interpretation
The intuition for the ‘Immediate Introduction’ and ‘No Introduction’ scenario is
straight forward. The benefit from the new product is either so high that the firm
does not want to wait or the benefit is too low such that the firm stays with the
established product. Thus, we focus on the interpretation of the interesting case
of delay. Note that for finite T ∗, before T ∗, the Hamiltonian H is greater than the
interest on the salvage value rS and at T ∗, they are equal15. In a sense the firm
exploits profits in m1 before moving to m2. By choosing T
∗ > 0, the Hamiltonian
is affected16 via the co-state λ(t). In economic terms, the following mechanisms
can be identified.
First, the delay in time leads to stronger discounting of the scrap value V m2−F .
The firm saves adoption costs as F is paid as a lump-sum, but gets V m2 later as
well. The latter is smoothed by the concave structure of the value function of m2 as
15Note that this is not necessarily true for the infinite case since if T ∗ is infinite, the transver-
sality condition for the co-state variable and hence the Hamiltonian would be altered.
16Note that the investment in established capacity depends on the co-state as well.
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the firm reduces capacities of the established product and hence V m2 increases17.
Second, in the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2, we find that
∂V m2
∂K2
(KF=01 , 0) = 0, (26)
which has an interesting economic intuition. In contrast to m1, in m2, the firm
is able to invest in K2. For F = 0 at K
F=0
1 and elsewhere, there is no reason for
waiting. But for higher F > 0, waiting yields discounting of adoption costs while at
KF=01 , (26) still holds and thus there is no gain from immediate switching tom2 and
investing in K2. Thus, by postponing the product introduction, the incumbent can
decrease the capacity of K1 before switching such that
∂Vm2
∂K2
(K lb1 , 0) > 0, i.e. when
switching, the marginal value of the new product’s capacity is higher and hence
there is an immediate gain from investment in K2. Hence, the investment pattern
in m2 is affected, where due to the reduced capacity of the established product,
the firm has stronger incentives to build-up capacities for the new product and
the disinvestment in the established product is weaker18 than it would be without
delay. Hence, in m2, profits drop and are initially lower than in m1 as there is a
strong investment in capacities of the new product but sales increase only gradually
for the new product. By delaying, the firm can postpone this drop in profits and
enjoy ’high’ profits in m1. However, the drop in profits is stronger compared to
immediate introduction.
4.2 Bifurcation analysis
We have a situation in mind where a new improved version of a product is launched
which is a close substitute to the established product. This is reflected by a rela-
tively high η and low θ. We do robustness checks with respect to those parameters
in Section 4.3.1. The other parameter choices are very standard.
From Figure 3, it is clear that the value function is not concave in K1 and hence
does not satisfy the Arrow-Mangasarian sufficiency conditions. Thus, as mentioned
17This holds as long as the switching capacity Klb1 is greater than the maximal argument of
V m2 which is true for the considered parameter setting.
18This is due to the increased marginal value of the established capacity.
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earlier, in this section we examine the qualitative properties of the steady states
of the control problem with introduction option with respect to the parameter F .
We start by drawing a bifurcation diagram of m1 (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram of m1.
The gray area is not present in m1 since if the firm starts in that area or arrives
there, it introduces the new product and hence is no more in m1 but in m2. As
we are interested in characterizing dynamics in m1 and in m2 together, we draw
a superimposed bifurcation diagram of both modes (cf. Hinloopen et al. (2017))
in Figure 6. For F < F˜ , we have a unique stable steady state. No matter if
Figure 6: Superimposed diagram.
the firm delays product introduction or not, it will eventually arrive at the steady
state level of K1 in m2 denoted by K
ss,m2
1 . As analyzed before, at F˜ there arises a
second steady state where for initial capacities K˜1 ≤ K1 ≤ Kub1 (which are in the
red area in Figure 6) the firm stays in m1 and eventually arrives at K
ss,m1
1 .
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At F¯ the equilibrium point Kss,m21 vanishes and it remains only K
ss,m1
1 for F > F¯
(see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Dynamics around F¯ .
Besides, we have a deformed pitchfork bifurcation which exhibits a hysteresis
phenomenon where initially only one stable steady state exists and for higher F a
second equilibrium arises ’out of the blue sky’, where a repelling curve separates
the two basins of attraction (red and blue area) where for very high F only the
second equilibrium remains. The black dashed curve is the Skiba curve (which is
repelling except at the two steady states where it is semi-stable). Note that for
capacities on the Skiba curve in between the two steady states, optimal paths are
moving in opposite directions but for capacities on the Skiba curve below Kss,m21
both optimal paths move in same direction (see Figure 7). Note that this is a
superimposed diagram and not a bifurcation diagram in the classical sense and
the latter is possible since there the firm either jumps immediately to m2 or never,
which means that we actually consider two disjoint optimal control problems where
the mode can be interpreted as a further state variable.
4.3 Characterization of optimal timing curves
As discussed in Section 3, for F ≥ F˜ , K˜1 separates finite and infinite solutions
for the optimal introduction time. Thus, it jumps at K˜1 to infinity. Hence, for
K˜1 ≤ K1 ≤ Kub1 , the value function of the problem with introduction option is
equal to the value function of the problem without introduction option.
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We now investigate in detail what happens when F approaches F˜ . The graphs
of the optimal introduction time are depicted in Figure 8. For low adoption costs,
F = 1 F = 1.274 F = F˜ ≈ 1.27437
Figure 8: Optimal time of switching for increasing F .
the correspondence is concave for K1 ≥ K lb1 . As analyzed in Section 3, it is finite
for low adoption costs whereas it becomes infinite at F˜ for K1 ≥ K˜1 = Kss,m11 .
For F approaching F˜ , T ∗(K1) becomes convex-concave and very steep at K
ss,m1
1 ,
i.e Kss,m11 becomes an inflection point (see Figure 8) which means that the firm
decreases higher capacities and ”stays around” Kss,m11 for a while until it starts
decreasing again down to K lb1 . Note that for F < F˜ , T
∗(K1) is finite everywhere,
whereas at F˜ , T ∗(K1) is infinite for K1 ≥ Kss,m11 .
Figure 9: Capacity-investment dynamics for F = 1.275.
Figure 9 depicts optimal curves in the (K1, I1) space for the interesting case of
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intermediate adoption costs where K˜1 separates the two basins of attraction. For
K lb1 < K1 < K˜1, the firm decreases capacities down to K
lb and introduces the new
product. In m2, it continues decreasing capacities of K1 down to K
ss,m2
1 while it
builds up capacities for the new product up to Kss,m22 .
4.3.1 Effect of horizontal and vertical differentiation
For decreasing degree of horizontal differentiation η, the products become more
differentiated and thus the firm is expected to benefit from this. As both markets
get more independent we expect that the firm is willing to introduce the new
product earlier. Numerical experiments are in line with this intuition (see Figure
10). Analogously, for increasing θ we get similar results.
Figure 10: Optimal time of switching for different parameterizations of η and θ.
5 Welfare implications
For analyzing welfare implications, note that the inverse demand functions stem
from the following utility function of the consumers where M is the initial endow-
ment:
CS(t) = u(K1, K2) = K1 +(1+θ)K2− 1
2
(K21 +K
2
2)−ηK1K2 +(M−p1K1−p2K2).
(27)
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The welfare depends on the interpretation of adoption costs. If it is paid to the
developer of the technology, then it is considered as a transfer and it is always
profitable to introduce the new product immediately. But if it is considered as
‘real’ costs, then it has to be taken into account. In that case, the social planner
maximizes the difference of consumer surplus and costs of investment and adoption:
max
T,I1(t),I2(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
u(K1, 0)− γ
2
I21
)
dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
u(K1, K2)− γ
2
(I21 + I
2
2 )
)
dt−e−rTF.
(28)
We expect that product introduction is favorable from a social point of view as in
m2, there is a new product of higher quality which affects the consumer only posi-
tively. For the given parameter setting, we find that delaying product introduction
occurs only for very large F , in particular for F > 2.4492 19. So, as expected, from
the perspective of a social planner, it is optimal to introduce immediately for a
wide range of F .
For the case of ’real’ costs, the welfare difference of the situation of a profit
maximizing firm and the situation where the firm is controlled by a social planner
is depicted in Figure 11 for Kini1 = K
ss,m1
1 . The welfare loss is initially constant
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Welfare gain for K1 = K
ss,m1
1 . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η =
0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
as in both situations, immediate introduction is optimal (as long as Kss,m11 < K
lb
1 )
but at some critical F (where K lb1 < K
ss,m1
1 ), the firm starts delaying the product
19Note that for the profit maximizing firm delay occurs even for F = ,  > 0, which is
substantially lower than 2.4492.
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introduction which increases the welfare loss. However, for F ≥ F˜ , the welfare
loss decreases (see Figure 11(b)) as the firm stays in m1 where F does not have
an effect whereas the welfare for the social planner decreases as costs of switching
to m2 increases.
6 Discussion of results and assumptions
Somewhat surprising is that the first appearance of solutions where the firm stays
with the established product is accompanied by a threshold point separating finite
and infinite solutions for the terminal time. One might think that the rationale
behind is that m1 and m2 are endogenously linked as in m2 the number of products
increases. But the phase-plane analysis (given in Appendix A.7) shows that this
situation might occur even for a switch to an exogenously given mode, in particular
whenever the terminal pair is on the unstable manifold.
From an economic perspective, delay was expected in order to discount adoption
costs and increase the scrap value at the time of introduction. Our analysis shows
that the decrease of established capacities is accompanied by a larger marginal
value for the new product in m2, i.e. investing in the capacities of the new product
is stronger than it would be with immediate introduction.
In our analysis, we abstract from competition. However, a monopoly could turn
into a competing environment if entry is possible. Thus, if there is a threat of
possible entrants, we expect that this would accelerate product introductions.
Another issue is that we do not consider the phase of development of the new
product. For the interpretation that the new product is developed by the incum-
bent himself, it is clear that the firm is not going to engage in R&D activities if the
product is not introduced eventually. In the case where the product is introduced
with some delay, we expect that R&D efforts would be less in the development
phase which would have a similar impact on the introduction time.
For the interpretation of external developers generating a new technology where
adoption costs mainly consist of buying the patent for the new technology, an
alternative option to adoption costs which has to be paid once when the product
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is introduced, would be to consider fees per unit which has to be paid to the
owner of the patent. There, as long as the fee per unit is constant and less than θ,
introduction would occur immediately since fees are paid continuously, so adoption
costs are ‘spread over time’.
We made the assumption that capacities are fully used, i.e. production equals
sales. We believe that this assumption is of minor consequence to our results since
in our model, there are no capacities for the new product in T and investment in
capacities has quadratic costs such that capacities are not build up as a ‘lump-
sum’ but slowly while the capacity of the established product is reduced slowly.
Moreover, in the case of delay, the incumbent starts reducing capacities even in
m1. A rigorous analysis of the full usage of capacity assumption yields that it is
optimal to exploit full capacity if the following conditions hold:
2K1 + ηK2 ≤ 1, (29)
ηK1 + 2K2 ≤ 1 + θ. (30)
Numerical experiments suggest that conditions (29) and (30) seem to be satisfied
for reasonable values of K1 (≤ Kss,m11 )20.
Furthermore, e.g. for decreasing demand, it is argued that in practice firms
reduce prices in order to maintain production rather than reducing production
due to contracts with employees and suppliers, even though such contracts are
20In the case of no horizontal and vertical differentiation, i.e. η = 1 and θ = 0, conditions (29)
and (30) are satisfied if
K1 ≥ 1
3
∧K2 ≤ 1
3
, (31)
or
K1 ≤ 1
3
∧K2 ≥ 1
3
. (32)
For our default parameter setting with F = 1.275, (31) and (32) are satisfied. In the case of
horizontal and vertical differentiation, (29) and (30) are weakened. For higher θ, the incumbent
wants to build up capacities for the new product faster, but also to decrease capacities of the
established product faster. For lower η, as products are more differentiated and competition of the
established and the new product is weakened, investment in the new product’s and disinvestment
of the established product’s capacities are slower. Thus, in both cases, we expect that (29) and
(30) are not affected much.
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not modeled here (cf. Goyal and Netessine (2007)). However, counterexamples
exist as well where firms have excess capacity e.g. for deterring entry (see Chicu
(2012)).
This analysis focuses on the effect of adoption costs. However, for some products,
not adoption costs but differences in production costs may be the main reason
for firms to abstain from product introduction, in particular if the old and new
product’s production costs differ a lot. Apple had developed a mouse in 1979
whose production costs were too much such that Apple abstained from further
development of this mouse and hence from introducing it (cf. Hinloopen et al.
(2013)).
7 Conclusion
Using a fully dynamic framework we identify different scenarios where the firm’s
behavior depends crucially on the capacity of the established product and on the
level of adoption costs. There is an interesting case where it is not optimal for the
firm to introduce the new product immediately but to delay product introduction.
By delay in time, adoption costs are discounted while the firm prepares for prod-
uct introduction by reducing capacities on the established market which increases
the marginal value of the established and new products’ capacities. Moreover, the
incumbent postpones investment in new capacity and hence benefits longer from
high profits before product introduction. Noteworthy is the occurrence of Skiba
points where the firm is indifferent in approaching different steady states which
affects the number of products produced by the firm. We assumed that firms can-
not invest in capacities beforehand. Allowing for investment before introduction
might have an effect on the time of introduction, in particular we expect that this
would accelerate product introduction while we think that qualitative results will
be the same. Furthermore, we abstained from competition which would be the
natural next step.
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A Appendix
A.1
The canonical system is given by
K˙1 =
λ
γ
− δK1,
λ˙ = (r + δ)λ− (1− 2K1),
(33)
and the isoclines are
K˙1 = 0 ⇔ λ = δγK1,
λ˙ = 0 ⇔ λ = 1− 2K1
r + δ
.
(34)
If the firm does not introduce the new product, i.e. for staying in m1 infinitely,
there is a unique steady state
Kss,m11 =
1
δγ(r + δ) + 2
, λss,m1 =
δγ
δγ(r + δ) + 2
. (35)
The steady state is a saddle point as the Jacobian is
−δ 1γ
2 r + δ
 (36)
with
det J = −δ(r + δ)− 2
γ
< 0. (37)
The eigenvalues are given by
µ1,2 =
r
2
±
√(r
2
)2
+ δ(r + δ), (38)
so eigenvalues have different sign and the steady state is indeed a saddle point.
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A.2
Lemma 2. Condition (15) holds for(
K∗1
)
1,2
= −d
f
±
√
2γrF
f 2
. (39)
Proof.
Consider the terminal condition21 (15):
H(K∗1 , I
∗
1 , λ(T
∗), T ∗) = rS
(
K∗1
)
(40)
⇔
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2
I∗1
2 + λ(T ∗)(I∗1 − δK∗1) = r(V m2(K∗1)− F ) (41)
⇔
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2
I∗1
2 +
∂V m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) = r(V m2(K∗1)− F ). (42)
The HJB-equation in m2 at T
∗ is given by22
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2
(I∗1
2 + I∗2
2) +
∂V m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) +
∂V m2
∂K2
I∗2 = rV
m2(K∗1). (43)
For I∗2 =
V
m2
K2
γ
, we have:
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2
I∗1
2 +
∂V m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) +
1
2γ
(∂V m2
∂K2
)2
= rV m2(K∗1). (44)
Using (44) and (42) yields
rF =
1
2γ
(∂V m2
∂K2
)2
, (45)
which under consideration of K2 = 0 yields the two solutions
K lb1 := −
d
f
−
√
2γrF
f 2
, (46)
and
Kub1 := −
d
f
+
√
2γrF
f 2
. (47)
21For convenience, we henceforth omit the dependence of state and control variables on T ∗.
22Note that F is paid for switching to m2 and does not occur in m2 anymore.
26
A.3
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2, we know that for F = 0
the terminal condition of the Maximum Principle holds for KF=01 and H < rS
for other values of capacity23. For F > 0, F occurs negatively on the right hand
side of the terminal condition and only there. Thus, there arises an interval whose
bounds are given by (46) and (47) wherein H > rS (see Figure 12). For Kini1
outside the interval, the opposite holds. Hence, for Kini1 ≤ K lb1 , the interest on
the salvage value is higher than the current value Hamiltonian. Thus, immediate
introduction is optimal.
(a) F = 0 (b) F = 1.2
Figure 12: Left hand side (H) and right hand side (rS) of terminal condition.
For K lb1 < K1 ≤ Kub1 the optimal switching capacity K lb1 has to be reached by
the transversality condition. Thus the firm reduces capacities down to K lb1 and
innovates.
A.4
Proof of Lemma 1. Taking the derivative of K lb1 with respect to F yields
∂K lb
∂F
= − 2γr
2f 2
√
2γrF
f2
= −
√
γr
2Ff 2
< 0 . (48)
23Cf. Appendix A.2. For F = 0, the square root in (39) vanishes and both solutions coincide.
Moreover, note that for F = 0, the only extra term in (44) in comparison to (42) is 12γ
(
∂Vm2
∂K2
)2
which is non-negative. Hence for all K1, H is less or equal than rS (it is equal for K
lb
1 (= K
ub
1 )
as 12γ
(
∂Vm2
∂K2
)2
= 0).
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A.5
Lemma 3. ∃! F˜ > 0 such that ∀F ≥ F˜ , ∃ K1 with T ∗(K1) = ∞, i.e. V (K1) =
V m1(K1) and ∀F < F˜ , @ K1 with T ∗(K1) =∞.
Proof. The value function of m1 without the option to switch to m2 is independent
of F whereas the value function of the control problem with introduction option is
decreasing in F due to the decreasing salvage value. Thus, there is some F˜ where
the value function of the control problem with introduction option hits the value
function of m1 for the first time which is greater than 0 since for F = 0, switching
is costless and in m2, there is the option of producing the new product which has
a higher quality (θ > 0)24.
A.6
Lemma 4. At F = F˜ ,
K lb1 ≤ K˜1 (49)
holds.
Proof. Let F = F˜ . Assume K˜1 < K
lb
1 . Then, for K˜1, H < rS, which yields that
the unique solution is to switch to m2 which contradicts F = F˜ .
A.7
We first state the following lemma which is necessary for the proof of Proposition
2.
Lemma 5. The dynamics at the terminal pair
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
are not K˙1 > 0 and
λ˙ > 0 simultaneously.
Proof. The terminal pair is determined by H = rS and λ(T ) = SK1 . The line
λ(T ) = SK1 = b + cK1 has a positive ordinate (b > 0) as K1’s marginal value is
24Even for no vertical differentiation, introducing the new product is beneficial as the market
is expanded and the firm is able to split the total quantity among the two products which yields
a higher price (cf. Dawid et al. (2015)).
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Figure 13: Vector plot for F = 1.275 (> F˜ ).
positive if there are no capacities installed. One might think that this line could
pass through the area to the right-upper of the intersection point of K˙1 = 0 and
λ˙ = 0 where K˙1 > 0 and λ˙ > 0 hold. This would yield different dynamics than
studied so far. However, one can easily show that for terminal pairs in that area,
there is no candidate for an optimal solution with 0 < T ∗ < ∞. In particular,
for Kini1 > K
lb
1 , there are either no candidate paths or only non-monotone paths
arriving at the terminal pair which cannot be optimal25. Converging to the steady
state of m1 along the stable manifold is not optimal as well as time consistency
is violated since for K1 < K
lb
1 , H < rS holds. Thus, there are no optimal paths
for Kini1 > K
lb
1 which yields a contradiction and proves that this situation cannot
occur. Moreover, the slope of the λ(T ) line is necessarily negative (c < 0), i.e. the
marginal value of K1 is decreasing as
∂2Vm2
∂K21
= c.
Proof of Proposition 2. As the steady state of m1 is a saddle-point, there is a
stable and unstable manifold. If T ∗ is finite but not zero, then the switching pair(
K1(T ), λ(T )
)
in the (K1, λ) space is derived from the condition H = rS and the
25Non-monotone paths imply a set of Skiba points which generates fluctuating paths for
T ∗ =∞, which contradicts to the uniqueness property of the steady state of the infinite horizon
problem.
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transversality condition λ(T ) = SK1 . As F increases and K
lb
1 decreases, there is
an F , where
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
is on the unstable manifold with K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 0
26.
Denote that F by F uns. For arriving at that pair, the initial pair has to be on
the unstable manifold. Thus, for all K1 ≥ Kss,m11 , there is no optimal path which
leads to (K lb1 , λ(T )), i.e. for all K1 ≥ Kss,m11 , T ∗(K1) =∞.
Next, we prove that F˜ = F uns. Obviously, F˜ ≤ F uns 27. Assume F˜ < F uns.
Then, by Lemma 1, at F˜ , the terminal pair is right to the unstable manifold.
Denote for all possible terminal values K1(T ) the value of the path which leads
to the terminal pair by V term(K1(t), K1(T ), F ) which in this case exists for all
K1 ≥ K1(T ) and for all F < F uns and is continuous in F .
In order to avoid confusion, for an F , we denote the correspondingK lb1 byK
lb
1 (F ).
For Kini1 > K˜1,
V term(Kini1 , K
lb
1 (F˜ ), F˜ ) < V
m1(Kini1 ), (50)
holds28. Hence, ∃ F l < F˜ with
V term(Kini1 , K
lb
1 (F
l), F l) = V m1(Kini1 ), (51)
which contradicts the minimality of F˜ . Hence, the assumption F˜ < F uns was
wrong and F˜ = F uns holds.
Now, we prove that K˜1 is not less than K
ss,m1
1 again by contradiction. Assume
that K˜1 < K
ss,m1
1 . Then, consider K
int
1 for which K˜1 < K
int
1 < K
ss,m1
1 holds. For
26As shown in Lemma 5, the dynamics at the terminal pair are not K˙1 > 0 and λ˙ > 0
simultaneously. Hence, the line passes through the area where K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 0 holds as it has
a positive ordinate and negative slope.
27Note that for Funs infinite solutions for T exist. As F˜ is the minimal value of adoption costs
for which infinite solutions exist, F˜ ≤ Funs holds.
28It can not be V term(Kini1 ,K
lb
1 (F ), F ) = V
m1(Kini1 ) since for K
ini
1 ≥ K˜1, trajectories of the
finite and infinite solution move in the same direction (as due to Lemma 4, Klb1 ≤ K˜1) and accord-
ing to Proposition 1 in Caulkins et al. (2015), in that case, the trajectories have to coincide for all
t ∈ [0, T ∗(Kini1 )] which is apparently not true. Moreover, V term(Kini1 ,Klb1 (F ), F ) > V m1(Kini1 )
cannot hold either since this leads to another solution for the problem without introduction op-
tion via moving to K˜1 along the path corresponding to the finite solution of T and switching at
K˜1 to the solution of the problem without introduction option.
30
F = F˜ , we have29
V term(Kint1 , K
lb
1 (F˜ ), F˜ ) < V
m1(Kint1 ). (52)
Again, by continuity of V term in F , there exists an F l < F˜ with
V term(Kint1 , K
lb
1 (F
l), F l) = V m1(Kint1 ), (53)
which contradicts the minimality of F˜ . Thus, K˜1 = K
ss,m1
1 and it is a threshold
point30 where the firm is not indifferent.
A.8
Proof of Proposition 3. As K lb1 decreases with F , for F˜ < F < F¯ , the terminal
pair
(
K1(T ), λ(T )
)
=
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
is left to the unstable manifold (cf. proof of
Proposition 2 in A.7). There, the dynamics are given by K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 0.
Starting at the terminal pair
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
and moving backwards along the arc
leading to it, i.e. considering V term introduced in A.7 (cf. Figure 13), we can
identify candidates for the optimal starting point for different Kini1 ’s. This arc hits
the K˙1 = 0 line at some K
h
1 . This is the highest K1 for which a finite candidate T
exists since following the arc further gives further candidates for K lb1 ≤ K1 < Kh1
as there is K˙1 > 0, which implies non-monotone paths for K1 which can not be
optimal (cf. Appendix A.7). Hence, V term is well defined. For any K1 < K
ss,m1
1 , it
is also possible to converge to the steady state of m1 by following the stable arc of
the steady state. Comparing values of both candidates by taking the upper curve
of the value functions corresponding to both options we obtain the value function
and the optimal strategies of the control problem with introduction option. Hence,
29Note that in this case, V term exists for K1 < K˜1. Moreover, as this problem is time invariant
and trajectories of the finite and infinite solution move in opposite directions and due to the
monotonicity of the trajectory of the infinite solution
(
see Hartl (1987)
)
, the trajectory of the
finite solution is monotone as well and there can not be an overlap region, i.e. there is no interval
of Skiba points (cf. Caulkins et al. (2015)). Thus, at F˜ for Kint1 , the infinite solution is the unique
optimal solution.
30Here, a threshold point is characterized by having finite and infinite solutions for T in every
neighborhood (cf. Caulkins et al. (2015)).
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there is an indifference point 0 < K˜1 ≤ Kh1 where the firm is indifferent moving
to the steady state along the stable manifold and moving to K lb1 . Thus, K˜1 is
a Skiba point. As F increases, K lb1 and K
h
1 decreases. Next, we prove that K˜1
decreases as well by contradiction. For F a, F b ∈ (F˜ , F¯ ), with F a < F b, denote the
corresponding indifference points by K˜1
a
and K˜1
b
and assume that K˜1
a ≤ K˜1b, i.e.
K˜1 is nondecreasing in F . Then,
V m1(K˜1
b
) = V term(K˜1
b
, K lb1 (F
b), F b) < V term(K˜1
b
, K lb1 (F
a), F a) ≤ V m1(K˜1b)
(54)
which yields a contradiction31 . Hence, K˜1 is decreasing in F .
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